By Raffaella Faggionato
The writer undertakes an research into the historical past of Russian Freemasonry that has now not been tried formerly. Her premise is that the Russian Enlightenment indicates extraordinary positive factors, which stop the applying of the interpretative framework known for the heritage of western suggestion. the writer bargains with the improvement of early Russian masonry, the formation of the Novikov circle in Moscow, the ‘programme’ of Rosicrucianism and the nature of its Russian variation and, ultimately, the conflict among the Rosicrucians and the nation. the writer concludes that the defenders of the Ancien Régime weren't mistaken. in truth the democratic behaviour, the severe angle, the perform of participation, the liberty of idea, the tolerance for the variety, the hunt for an immediate verbal exchange with the divinity, briefly the entire attitudes and behaviours first practiced contained in the eighteenth century Rosicrucian motels constituted a cultural adventure which unfold during the complete society. Novikov’s imprisonment in 1792 and the warfare opposed to the Rosicrucian literature have been makes an attempt to thwart a tradition, in response to the independence of inspiration that was once taking root contained in the very institution, representing a threat to its stability.
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Extra resources for A Rosicrucian Utopia in Eighteenth-Century Russia: The Masonic Circle of N.I. Novikov
Then such a vitalist account is, I suggest, inconsistent with solipsism – on non-epistemological grounds. Since the functionally primary psychological phenomenon is a phenomenon that systematically interacts causally with the environment, this theory implies that any ‘given’ which includes one’s own mind is obliged to include in addition a sustaining environment. After all, causality can exist no other wise than concretely. While intentionality cannot ensure the existence of answering material objects to the phenomena of consciousness, it seems that the essentially vital character of mind guarantees the existence of a sustaining environment to which the mind adheres in systematic manner.
It seems to me that animality as such necessitates the capacity to detect, not necessarily individuated objects, but at least what one might call ‘the ways of the physical ’; which is to say, items such as position and solidity that are at once determinants of manipulative action and specifically the subject-matter of physics. But it appears to need no more. In particular, it does not require the capacity (‘attunement’) to recognise instances of animality and therefore any psychological state outside itself, which one might call an awareness of ‘the ways of the psychological ’; nor to recognise group mental phenomena like (say) panic or ‘the ways of the group’, a capacity which I shall here dub ‘togetherness’; nor what we have called ‘sociality’, meaning the possession of the (socially determined) concept of ‘another than me’ and thus of social ways.
To be sure, the selfconscious and the unself-conscious are, in the very same sense, conscious. But self-consciousness exhibits peculiarities that cannot be extrapolated to all varieties of consciousness. Above all, its necessary sociality (as one might call it). Thus, we know from the highly diverse considerations advanced by 26 Introduction Hegel, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Freud, that self-consciousness is in some important sense actually constituted out of an awareness of ‘the other’. Better expressed, the possession of the concept of ‘another than me’ is a necessary and constitutive condition of self-consciousness.