By Ken Wilber
Here's a concise, accomplished evaluation of Wilber's innovative inspiration and its software in brand new international. In A concept of every little thing, Wilber makes use of transparent, nontechnical language to offer advanced, state of the art theories that combine the geographical regions of physique, brain, soul, and spirit. He then demonstrates how those theories and types may be utilized to real-world difficulties in components resembling politics, medication, enterprise, schooling, and the surroundings. Wilber additionally discusses day-by-day practices that readers soak up which will practice this integrative imaginative and prescient to their very own daily lives.
Read or Download A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality PDF
Similar consciousness & thought books
It is a transparent overview of Hume's theories of the self and private identification, together with his recognized Treatise on Human Nature. Pitson offers a severe exploration of his considering, additionally analyzing the ongoing relevance of Hume's theories for modern philosophy and touching on it to his broader reflections on human nature itself.
- Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective
- Naming the Rainbow: Colour Language, Colour Science, and Culture
- The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness
- Dream psychology
- Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming
Extra info for A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality
Moreover, the idea of three fundamental kinds of motive, and corresponding psychological tendencies and characters, is an important part of the background to the argument for tripartition of the soul in Republic 4. At the outset of the argument, it is already agreed between Socrates and Glaucon that ‘each one of us has within himself the same kinds and characteristics (, δη τ, κα sθη) as the city’, namely spirit (τ θυµο,ιδN ), love of learning (τ ιλοµαθN ), and love of money (τ ιλοχρxµατον) (435 D 9–436 A 3).
First, it disregards Socrates’ careful distinction between two ways of analysing apparent cases of simultaneous opposition (the archer and the spinning top modes of analysis). Secondly, if soul-parts are merely properties, we cannot take literally Socrates’ talk of the embodied soul as a composite (610 B 4–6), as one thing composed of a plurality of parts (443 E 1–2). And thirdly, Socrates’ (direct) attribution to soul-parts of desires and aversions, pleasures (580 D 6–7), beliefs (571 D 2, 603 A 1–2, 605 C 1–2), and emotions (604 D 7–9, 606 A 3–7) sits awkwardly with a conception of soul-parts as properties of the soul (or, for that matter, with a conception of them as capacities or faculties).
It should be noted, however, that Socrates neither says nor implies that it is speciﬁcally some part or other, but not the whole, of the spinning top that is in motion or at rest. To do so would be to offer an incorrect analysis, and it would also amount to an entirely unwarranted rejection of the opponent’s pointed description of the top as ~σ τ, \µα being as a whole at rest and in motion at the same time (436 D 5: ο γ, στρ βιλοι λοι Qστα κα κινου~νται). On the other hand, if Plato’s purpose is simply to distinguish between two kinds of motion, it might seem irrelevant that straightness and roundness are somehow internal to the moving object.