By Tony Pitson
It is a transparent review of Hume's theories of the self and private identification, together with his recognized Treatise on Human Nature. Pitson offers a severe exploration of his pondering, additionally analyzing the continued relevance of Hume's theories for modern philosophy and bearing on it to his broader reflections on human nature itself. Divided into components, Pitson's examine follows Hume's vital contrast among elements of private id: the ''mental'' and the ''agency''. the 1st half discusses Hume's perception of the brain as a ''bundle'' or ''system'' of perceptions and explores Hume's place at the conventional mind/body challenge. within the moment half Pitson examines a number issues together with Hume's remedy of personality, the connection among human and animal nature, and the character of business enterprise.
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It is a transparent overview of Hume's theories of the self and private id, together with his recognized Treatise on Human Nature. Pitson presents a serious exploration of his pondering, additionally studying the continued relevance of Hume's theories for modern philosophy and bearing on it to his broader reflections on human nature itself.
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Additional resources for Humes Philosophy Of The Self
But rather as the performance itself is in some sense reducible to the activity of a number of individuals, so our mental life consists in the activity of the perceptions which, on Hume’s account, go to make up the mind. 19. ) III HUME ON IDENTITY So far I have been concerned with one aspect of Hume’s discussion of personal identity, namely, his rejection of the self as something simple and identical which underlies our perceptions, and his alternative to this in the form of an account of the mind (foreshadowed in the opening sections of the Treatise) as a bundle or system of perceptions.
4 In this latter case, what is involved is presumably a kind of complex perception which takes the successive perceptions of my mind as its object. Now, this view of consciousness appears to provide Hume with a basis for individuating my perceptions as subject, and my corresponding perceptions as self-observer. In the former case, I may have a perception which is a recollection of some past perception to the extent that it is, in effect, a kind of present awareness of that past perception. In the latter case, I have a perception which is not only a kind of reflected awareness of the past perception in question; it is also an awareness of it as part of the succession of perceptions which constitute my mind.
I am concerned here to show how Hume may be defended against a variety of objections to be found in the secondary literature, including those directed to Hume’s account of the relation of perceptions to the mind they supposedly constitute. I conclude with some remarks about Hume’s position in relation to the existence of the self. e. which remains the same over time), arises from the fact that we ascribe a continuing identity to the perceptions of the mind; something we do in spite of the obvious variations and interruptions of these perceptions, because they possess certain features which result in an association of their ideas in the 32 HUME AND THE IDEA OF THE SELF imagination.